Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games
Fabrizio Germano ()
Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained with a fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experiments on rules and games.
Keywords: Rules; evolutionary dynamics; stochastic dynamics; bounded rationality; learning; normal form games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:761
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