Voting with preferences over margins of victory

Humberto Llavador

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative. The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Keywords: Margin of victory; plurality; abstention; strategic voting; committee voting; elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10, Revised 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Voting with Preferences over Margins of Victory (2015)
Journal Article: Voting with preferences over margins of victory (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:900

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