Existence of sparsely supported correlated equilibria

Fabrizio Germano and Gabor Lugosi

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We show that every finite N-player normal form game possesses a correlated equilibrium with a precise lower bound on the number of outcomes to which it assigns zero probability. In particular, the largest games with a unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games; moreover, the lower bound grows exponentially in the number of players N.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; finite games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-10, Revised 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:907

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