Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit
Luis Corchon and
Matthias Dahm
Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics
Abstract:
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)
Keywords: Teoria de jocs; Ciències polítiques -- Models matemàtics; Presa de decisions; 338 - Situació econòmica. Política econòmica. Gestió; control i planificació de l'economia. Producció. Serveis. Turisme. Preus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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http://hdl.handle.net/2072/148481
Related works:
Journal Article: Welfare maximizing contest success functions when the planner cannot commit (2011) 
Working Paper: Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/148481
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