Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

Montserrat Ferré Carracedo

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Keywords: Integració monetària; Política fiscal (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/1774

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