Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez () and
Josep E. Peris
Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics
Abstract:
The idea of ensuring a guarantee (a minimum amount of the resources) to each agent has recently acquired great relevance, in both social and politi- cal terms. Furthermore, the notion of Solidarity has been treated frequently in redistribution problems to establish that any increment of the resources should be equally distributed taking into account some relevant characteris- tics. In this paper, we combine these two general concepts, guarantee and solidarity, to characterize the uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (Con- strained Equal Awards and Constrained Equal Losses rules). Keywords: Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, Lower bounds, Bankruptcy problems, Solidarity. JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.
Keywords: Fallida; Jocs cooperatius; Economia del benestar; Elecció social; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://hdl.handle.net/2072/182646
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Working Paper: Solidarity and uniform rules in bankruptcy problems (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/182646
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