On the coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez () and Misericòrdia Vilella Bach

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we prove that the Mas-Colell bargaining set coincides with the core for three-player balanced and superadditive cooperative games. This is no longer true without the superadditivity condition or for games with more than three-players. Furthermore, under the same assumptions, the coincidence between the Mas-Collel and the individual rational bargaining set (Vohra (1991)) is revealed. Keywords: Cooperative game, Mas-Colell bargaining set, balancedness, individual rational bargaining set. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius; Economia del benestar; Elecció social; 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/220221

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