Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility

José Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Peter Sudhölter and Misericòrdia Vilella Bach

Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics

Abstract: A non-negative transferable utility (TU) game is average monotonic if there exists a non-negative allocation according to which the relative worth is not decreasing when enlarging the coalition. We generalize this definition to the nontransferable utility (NTU) case. It is shown that an average monotonic NTU game shares several properties with an average monotonic TU game. In particular it has a special core element and there exists a population monotonic allocation scheme. We show that an NTU bankruptcy game is average monotonic with respect to the claims vector. Keywords: nontransferable utility; average monotonicity; core; population monotonicity JEL classification: C71

Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica); 33 - Economia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/535076

Related works:
Journal Article: Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility (2023)
Working Paper: Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/535076

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ariadna Casals ().