The Economics of Tort Law: A Précis

Guiseppe Dari Mattiaci and Francesco Parisi
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

No 03-13, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: Economic analysis has long been employed for the study of tort liability. This paper revisits the main contributions to the subject emphasizing the inherent impossibility for tort liability to set perfectly efficient first-best incentives to take precaution for all parties to an accident and the need to choose among second best outcomes. The paper provides a pathfinder through the literature in various areas of tort law and economics

Keywords: communal liability; tort; ancient law; primitive society; group liability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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