The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules

G. Dari Mattiacci and G.G.A. de Geest
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci

No 04-17, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: Sharing rules have a filtering effect on violations: they prevent the most harmful violations and let the least harmful ones occur. We show under what conditions the filtering effect improves social welfare and argue that this may explain why, in most areas of the law, sharing rules are, in general, preferred to rules that entirely burden one party. Our analysis applies to comparative negligence, communal liability, the allocation of police investigation efforts, contract remedies for non-verifiable breaches such as those that may occur in marriage and employment contracts, and to the distribution of shares in partnerships.

Keywords: comparative negligence; law enforcement; divorce; employment contracts; theory of the firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The Filtering Effect of Sharing Rules (2005)
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