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Understanding preferences for ascending auctions, Buy-It-Now auctions and fixed prices

J.M.J. Delnoij, Kris De Jaegher and Stephanie Rosenkranz

No 14-02, Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: This paper experimentally analyzes how consumers decide between entering a fixed price, an ascending auction or a BIN auction. We find that such entry decisions depend both on potential payoffs (price aspects) and consumer characteristics (non-price aspects). For values smaller than or equal to BIN prices, subjects are more likely to enter a mechanism that involves bidding. Conversely, for values greater than BIN prices, subjects are more likely to enter a mechanism that involves immediate buying. We further find that price aspects mainly play a role for values greater than BIN prices, whereas non-price aspects play a role for values smaller than or equal to BIN prices. Impatience makes subjects less likely to enter a mechanism involving bidding, whereas sensation seekingness and regret make subjects more likely to enter such a mechanism. Gender also has an impact on entry decisions.

Keywords: Entry decisions; Fixed price; Ascending auction; Buy-It-Now auction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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