The Politics of Bank Failures in Russia

Zuzana FungÃ¡Ä ová, Alexei Karas, Laura Solanko and Laurent Weill

Working Papers from Utrecht School of Economics

Abstract: We study whether bank failure probability systematically varies over the election cycle in Russia. Using monthly data for 2002-2020 and controlling for standard bank risk indicators we find that bank failure is less likely during periods preceding presidential elections. We explore whether this effect is more pronounced for banks whose failure is associated with greater political costs, such as important players in the household deposit market or important players in regional markets. We find no evidence for this latter effect. Overall, our results provide mixed evidence that political cycles matter for the occurrence of bank failures in Russia.

Keywords: Bank Failure; Election; Russia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis, nep-fdg, nep-pol, nep-rmg and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The politics of bank failures in Russia (2023)
Working Paper: The politics of bank failures in Russia (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:use:tkiwps:2206

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