Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening

Andrei Barbos

No 613, Working Papers from University of South Florida, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies a model in which an agent considers proposing a project of unknown quality to an evaluator, who has to decide on whether or not to accept it. Earlier papers considered the case when the evaluation is perfect and showed than higher submission fees increase the expected quality of projects submitted for review by discouraging long-shot submissions. We examine the case of two-sided incomplete information where not only the agent's, but also the evaluator's assessment of the project is imperfect. We show that under this specifcation, an increase in the submis- sion fee may lead to a decrease in the quality of projects that are implemented because of its adverse effects on the evaluator's acceptance policy.

Keywords: Evaluation; Project Screening; Regulatory Burden (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D82 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Forthcoming in Journal of Economics

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B0DaoNloCZvkTm1ONXBYdEp4bXc/edit?pli=1 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Imperfect evaluation in project screening (2014)
Working Paper: Imperfect Evaluation in Project Screening (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usf:wpaper:0613

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of South Florida, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Diogo Baerlocher ().