Poets as consultants? Economic contract theory in German literature

Urs Birchler ()

University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002 from Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen

Abstract: In German literature, particularly in poetry, an amazing wealth of illustrations for economic contract theory can be found. Signaling, screening, incentive contracts, the winner's curse, and even the prisoner's dilemma within a team are treated by different writers. The respective examples are attractive for at least two reasons: First, for their clear representation of economic or game theoretic structures; and second, for their interdisciplinary nature, combining economics with law and psychology. Should we thus look at writers as consultants superior to economists? The answer is "no" in the sense that writers do not tell us how to behave in any particular situation, but "yes" in the sense that they remind us to be modest with respect to our strategic faculties; an advice not necessarily welcome to the economists' profession.

Keywords: Contract Theory; Game Theory; Law and Economics; Economic Teaching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A23 D82 K00 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2002-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-law and nep-mic
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