EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Welfare and Distribution Effects of Bank Secrecy Laws

Frode Brevik () and Manfred Gärtner ()

University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 from Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen

Abstract: We analyze an overlapping-generations world comprising two groups of small countries whose preferences for public spending differ. Key steady-state effects from introducing bank secrecy and a withholding tax in countries with low government spending are: a reduction of global capital and income, a shift of wealth towards bank-secrecy countries, and falling consumption, welfare and government spending despite rising tax rates in the rest of the world. Qualitative results are robust to changes in tax-payer honesty, the Leviathan effect (permitting governments to drive public spending higher than citizens prefer), and the fraction of withholding taxes repatriated to countries of residence.

JEL-codes: E2 E62 F42 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2005-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2005/DP-07_G.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:dp2005:2005-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 from Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Joerg Baumberger ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).

 
Page updated 2024-12-29
Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2005:2005-07