Do Institutions of Direct Democracy Tame the Leviathan? Swiss Evidence on the Structure of Expenditure for Public Education

Justina A. V. Fischer

University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 from Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen

Abstract: Identification of a deleterious impact of institutions of direct legislation on student performance by studies for both the U.S. and Switzerland has raised the question of the exact transmission channels for this impact. Studies for the U.S. that find an increase in the ratio of administrative to instructional spending and larger class sizes support the hypothesis of a Leviathan-like school administration. However, research for Switzerland using a time-series panel of sub-federal school expenditure and class size detects no such effect. These findings are in line with previous analyses that identify efficiency gains in the provision of public goods for Switzerland. Version: 7 Dec 2005

JEL-codes: H41 H72 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2005-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-edu, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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