When Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private Investment?

Stefan Buehler and Simon Wey ()

No 1209, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: This note examines the conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political agenda crowds out investment by a private firm. We show that crowding out occurs if the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes and private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm's perspective.

Keywords: Public investment; crowding out; political agenda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H42 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2012-03
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http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1209.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: When Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private Investment? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2012:09

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