Why do tougher caseworkers increase employment? The role of programme assignment as a causal mechanism

Martin Huber, Giovanni Mellace and Michael Lechner

No 1414, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: Previous research found that less accommodating caseworkers are more successful in placing unemployed workers into employment. This paper tries to shed more light on the causal mechanisms behind this result using semiparametric mediation analysis. Analysing very informative linked jobseeker-caseworker data for Switzerland, we find that the positive employment effects of less accommodating caseworkers are not driven by a particularly ef-fective mix of labour market programmes they use, but rather by other dimensions of the counselling process, possibly including threat effects of sanctions, pressure to accept jobs, and other factors related to the caseworker’s counselling style.

Keywords: Unemployment; counselling style; active labour market policy; direct effects; indirect effects; causal mechanisms; causal channels; matching estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C31 J64 J68 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1414.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Why Do Tougher Caseworkers Increase Employment? The Role of Program Assignment as a Causal Mechanism (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2014:14

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