Transparency in Parliamentary Voting

Christine Benesch (), Monika Bütler () and Katharina Hofer

No 1602, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: We use a change in the voting procedures of one of the two chambers of the Swiss parliament to explore how transparency affects the voting behavior of its members. Until 2013, the Upper House (Council of States) had voted by a show of hands. Legislators' decisions could only be verified ex post through the time-consuming screening of online videos. In 2014, halfway through the legislative period, the chamber switched to electronic voting with online publication of individual decisions, significantly increasing transparency. Data cover individual voting behavior during the 2011- 2015 legislative period. In a difference-in-difference framework, the Lower House (National Council), serves as a control group. Not only have the voting procedures of the Lower House remained unchanged since 2007 but also the legislative texts of the votes we analyze are the same in both chambers. This unique framework makes it possible to estimate the causal effects of transparency on legislators' choices. Members of the Upper House are significantly less likely to deviate from their party line after the reform. While parties benefit from improved conformity, voters lose influence over their legislators. Two legislators representing the same canton are less likely to cast an aligned vote if their parties have distinct party lines.

Keywords: Voting; Parliament; Transparency; Parties; Party discipline; Principal agent theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D80 L88 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59pages
Date: 2016-02, Revised 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1602.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Transparency in parliamentary voting (2018)
Working Paper: Transparency in Parliamentary Voting (2015)
Working Paper: Transparency in Parliamentary Voting (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2016:02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().