The Optimal Design of Round-Robin Tournaments with Three Players

Alex Krumer, Reut Megidish () and Aner Sela

No 1713, Economics Working Paper Series from University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science

Abstract: We study the optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three symmetric players. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in these tournaments with either one or two prizes. Our results show that the players who wish to maximize their expected payoffs or their probabilities of winning have different preferences about the order of games under tournaments with one or two prizes. We analyze the optimal allocations of players for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total effort in the tournaments with one and two prizes, and by comparing between them, it is demonstrated that in order to maximize the players' expected total effort the designer should allocate only one prize.

Keywords: Multi-stage contests; all-pay auctions; first-mover advantage; second-mover advantage; round-robin tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D00 D20 D44 L00 O31 Z20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/econwp/EWP-1713.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The optimal design of round-robin tournaments with three players (2020)
Working Paper: THE OPTIMAL DESIGN OF ROUND-ROBIN TOURNAMENTS WITH THREE PLAYERS (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:econwp:2017:13

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