Illiquidity spirals in Coupled Over-The-Counter Markets
Christoph Aymanns (),
Co-Pierre Georg and
No 1810, Working Papers on Finance from University of St. Gallen, School of Finance
Banks provide intermediation of two economically coupled assets, each traded on an OTC market—e.g., secured debt and the underlying collateral. We model banks’ decisions to provide liquidity as a game of strategic complements on two coupled trading networks:incentives to be active in one network are increasing in its neighbors’ activity in both networks. When an exogenous shock renders some banks inactive, other banks follow in an illiquidity spiral across the two networks. Liquidity can be improved if one of the two OTC markets is replaced by an exchange. For a class of market structures associated with random graphs, liquidity changes discontinuously in the size of an exogenous shock, in contrast to contagion on one network.
Keywords: market liquidity; funding liquidity; over-the-counter markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 G21 G23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usg:sfwpfi:2018:10
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