Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation

Roberto Galbiati and Pietro Vertova ()

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: Laws consist of two components: the ‘obligations’ they express and the ‘incentives’ designed to enforce them. In this paper we run a public good experiment to test whether or not obligations have any independent effect on cooperation in social dilemmas. The results show that, for given marginal incentives, different levels of minimum contribution required by obligation determine significantly different levels of average contributions. Moreover, unexpected changes in the minimum contribution set up by obligation have asymmetric dynamic effects on the levels of cooperation: a reduction does not alter the descending trend of cooperation, whereas an increase induces a temporary re-start in the average level of cooperation. Nonetheless, obligations per se cannot sustain cooperation over time.

Keywords: Obligation; Incentives; Public Good Game; Experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 H26 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-law, nep-reg and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation (2005)
Working Paper: Law and Behaviours in Social Dilemmas: Testing the Effect of Obligations on Cooperation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:001

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