Voting the public expenditure: an experiment

Carla Marchese () and Marcello Montefiori

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its effects upon efficiency are also discussed.

Keywords: experiment; voting rule; public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:020

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