Virtual vs. Standard Strike: An Experiment

Alessandro Innocenti () and Antonio Nicita ()

Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena from University of Siena

Abstract: In this paper we compare - in the laboratory - stoppage and virtual strike. Our experiment confirms that higher wages offered by an employer lead to considerably more costly effort provision. The number of strikes, the level of efforts and average total payoffs are higher under virtual strike than under standard strike. However, when standard strike is associated with reciprocal externalities, it induces higher effort levels, higher payoffs and an extremely reduced number of strikes than virtual strike. It is unclear whether this behavior re?ects reciprocity or other forms of social preferences. However our results might explain why standard strikes rather than virtual ones are generally adopted by workers.

Keywords: virtual strike; cooperation; reciprocity; fairness; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D74 D78 J52 K31 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:labsit:026

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