On Game Formats and Chu Spaces

Stefano Vannucci ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: It is argued that virtually all coalitional, strategic and extensive game formats as currently employed in the extant game-theoretic literature may be presented in a natural way as discrete nonfull or even-under a suitable choice of morphisms- as full subcategories of Chu (Poset 2).

JEL-codes: C72 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:417

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