Dynamic Consistency in Extensive form Decision Problems

Nicola Dimitri ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: In a stimulating paper Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) argued how a decision maker could undertake dynamically inconsistent choices when, in an extensive form decision problem, she exhibits a particular type of imperfect recall named absentmindedness. Such imperfection obtains whenever an information set includes histories along the same decision path. Starting from work focusing on the Absentminded Driver example, and independently developed by Segal (2000) and Dimitri (1999), the main theorem of this paper provides a general result of dynamically consistent choices, valid for a large class of finite extensive form decision problems without nature.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-gth
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