In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures

Antonio Nicita () and Matteo Rizzolli

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: The standard model of optimal deterrence predicts that the probability of wrongful conviction of the innocent is, at the margin, as detrimental to deterrence as the wrongful acquittal of guilty individuals. We extend the model in several directions: using expected utility as well as nonexpected utility to consider the role of risk aversion, non-linear probability weighting and loss aversion. We also consider how relevant emotions such as guilt, shame and indignation play out. Several of these factors support the intuition that wrongful convictions of the innocent do have a larger detrimental impact on deterrence and thus the policy implications are reconciled with the widely shared maxim in dubio pro reo. We then draw some theoretical implications such as a novel justification for the different standards of proof in criminal vs civil law as well as other policy implications.

Keywords: wrongful convictions; Type I errors; wrongful acquittals; Type II errors; evidence; optimal under-deterrence; behavioral economics; risk aversion; loss aversion; prospect theory; prelec function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K41 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-law and nep-upt
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http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/637.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral Explanations of Pro-defendant Bias in Procedures (2014)
Working Paper: In Dubio Pro Reo. Behavioral explanations of pro-defendant bias in procedures (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:637

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