Strategy-Proof Aggregation Rules in Median Join-Semilattices and Arrowian Social Welfare Functions
Ernesto Savaglio () and
Stefano Vannucci ()
Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena
Three characterizations of the whole class of strategyproof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal total preorders in Ã–nite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such class consists precisely of generalized weak consensus-sponsorship rules induced by certain families of order Ã–lters of the coalition poset. It follows that the co-majority rule and many other inclusive aggregation rules belong to that class. The co-majority rule for an odd number of agents is also characterized. The existence of strategy-proof anonymous neutral and unanimity-respecting social welfare functions which satisfy a suitably relaxed independence condition is shown to follow from our characterizations.
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:834
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fabrizio Becatti ().