Strategy-Proof Aggregation Rules in Median Join-Semilattices and Arrowian Social Welfare Functions

Ernesto Savaglio () and Stefano Vannucci ()

Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena

Abstract: Three characterizations of the whole class of strategyproof aggregation rules on rich domains of locally unimodal total preorders in Önite median join-semilattices are provided. In particular, it is shown that such class consists precisely of generalized weak consensus-sponsorship rules induced by certain families of order Ölters of the coalition poset. It follows that the co-majority rule and many other inclusive aggregation rules belong to that class. The co-majority rule for an odd number of agents is also characterized. The existence of strategy-proof anonymous neutral and unanimity-respecting social welfare functions which satisfy a suitably relaxed independence condition is shown to follow from our characterizations.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.deps.unisi.it/quaderni/834.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usi:wpaper:834

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics University of Siena from Department of Economics, University of Siena Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Fabrizio Becatti ().