Blocking the light at the end of the tunnel? Optimal teleworking agreements and management's revealed preferences when vaccine is on the horizon

Jacek Rothert

Departmental Working Papers from United States Naval Academy Department of Economics

Abstract: During a pandemic companies adopt teleworking agreements even if they put zero weight on its workforce welfare, as long as the quality of its future product may be a ected by current health outcomes of its workers. News about a vaccine leads to an increase in the scope of teleworking agreements if and only if the management puts a strictly positive weight on its workforce welfare. Ceteris paribus, a rational management would never reduce the scope of teleworking agreements when vaccine is on the horizon. If new safety protocols appear successful in limiting or avoiding the health risks for tasks done on-site (e.g. lack of viral transmission with in-person teaching under a hybrid model), the reduction in the scope of teleworking agreements will be excessive if managers do not understand Lucas' Critique.

Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2021-02
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.usna.edu/EconDept/RePEc/usn/wp/usnawp68.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to www.usna.edu:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:usn:usnawp:68

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Departmental Working Papers from United States Naval Academy Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().