Human Capital and Hold-ups in Indigenous Society: The Role of Customs and the Market
Matthew Baker ()
Departmental Working Papers from United States Naval Academy Department of Economics
In this paper I discuss the application of some simple models of contracting, bargaining, and human capital acquisition can be employed to understand cross cultural variation in the form and nature of institutions governing land inheritance, marital residence, and the gender division of labor.
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