The electoral migration cycle
Federico Revelli ()
Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers from University of Turin
This paper puts forward a new test of Tiebout sorting that relies on the exogenous time structure of recurrent local elections. The test is based on the idea that the policy uncertainty that is associated with periodic competitive elections should be expected to induce delay of migration, thus generating an electoral migration cycle of relatively low rates of migration before the elections, followed by relatively high rates of migration when electoral uncertainty is resolved. Conversely, interjurisdictional migration flows that are unrelated to local public service provision motives ought to be orthogonal to the timing of local elections. Empirically, I study sorting patterns across several thousands of peninsular Italy's municipalities through the increasingly turbulent 2002-2013 decade. I find evidence of an electoral migration cycle in the sense that the timing of internal migration flows is systematically influenced by the schedule of recurrent mayoral elections.
Pages: 32 pages
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Journal Article: The electoral migration cycle (2019)
Working Paper: The electoral migration cycle (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uto:dipeco:201548
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