When Scapegoating Backfires: The pitfalls of Blaming Migrants for a Crisis
Michela Boldrini (),
Pierluigi Conzo,
Willem Sas () and
Roberto Zotti
Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers from University of Turin
Abstract:
In times of hardship, politicians often leverage citizens’ discontent and scapegoat minorities to obtain political support. This paper tests whether political campaigns scapegoating migrants for a health crisis affect social, political, and economic attitudes and behaviors. Through an online nationally-representative survey experiment in Italy, we analyze the effects of such narratives through information-provision treatments, which include facts also emphasizing the alleged health consequences of ongoing immigration. Results show that narratives associating immigration with health threats do not generate sizeable add-on effects compared to those based on immigration only. If anything, they increase disappointment towards co-nationals, reduce institutional trust, and undermine partisanship among extreme-right supporters. Results are consistent with a theoretical framework where party credibility and support, and institutional trust are influenced by political discourse. Our experiment underpins the prediction that political campaigns based on extreme narratives can be ineffective or socially and politically counterproductive, providing an example of how populism can backfire.
Pages: pages 120
Date: 2023-08
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Working Paper: When scapegoating backfires: The pitfalls of blaming migrants for a crisis (2023) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uto:dipeco:202311
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