Performance in Pass-Fail Assessments

Giuseppe Bertola

Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers from University of Turin

Abstract: Trading the cost of better performance o§ the probability that an imprecise testís performance estimate falls short of the pass threshold, an assessee may perform above the threshold (and fear failure because of negative errors) or below it (and hope to pass because of positive errors). This paper characterizes in general and with a speciÖc model how that choice depends on the testís precision and threshold, which the assessor may choose to elicit high performance, and on other features of the assesseeís problem, which the assessor must take as given and may not know exactly. When it is costly for the assessor to increase precision and assessees are heterogeneous it is optimal for some to fear failing, for others to hope to pass. This is empirically true in the results of exams that conform to the modelís assumptions. The model is also applicable to editorial and research funding processes.

Pages: pages 36
Date: 2024-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Performance in Pass-Fail Assessments (2024)
Working Paper: Performance in Pass-Fail Assessments (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uto:dipeco:202408

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