Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem
Yusuke Kasuya () and
Kentaro Tomoeda ()
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Yusuke Kasuya: Kobe University
No 2019/07, Working Paper Series from Economics Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney
We propose a new solution concept in the roommate problem, based on the “robustness” of deviations (i.e., blocking coalitions). We call a deviation from a matching robust up to depth k, if none of the deviators gets worse off than at the original matching after any sequence of at most k subsequent deviations. We say that a matching is stable against robust deviations (for short, SaRD) up to depth k, if there is no robust deviation up to depth k. As a smaller k imposes a stronger requirement for amatching to be SaRD, we investigate the existence of a matching that is SaRD with a minimal depth k. We constructively demonstrate that a SaRDmatching always exists for k = 3, and establish sufficient conditions for k = 1 and 2.
Keywords: matching; stability; robustness; roommate problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Stability against Robust Deviations in the Roommate Problem (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uts:ecowps:2019/07
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