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Improving pension management and delivery: An (im)modest and likely (un)popular proposal

Ron Bird () and Jack Gray

Published Paper Series from Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney

Abstract: The single-minded aim of retirement savings policy is to maximize after-cost returns to members while providing products and services to meet individual needs. In that it fails. The dominant cause of failure is ineffective and unnecessary competition. The dominant solution is greater cooperation. This article demonstrates how excessive competition has undermined investors’ ability to save for retirement through inefficient pricing, agency costs, and excessive choice. To ensure more cooperation, and less competition, the authors propose a three-pronged approach: Structuring management arrangements to extract maximum economic growth and investment returns; taking steps to rid the system of over-servicing; and, structuring relationships to minimize agency costs. While the authors use Australia as their institutional setting, their (im)modest, and likely (un)popular proposal has universal (un)appeal and applicability.

Keywords: Agency Costs; Co-opetition; Industry Rationalization; Market Failures; Pension Fund (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2009-01-01
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Published in: Bird, R. and Gray, J., 2009, "Improving pension management and delivery: An (im)modest and likely (un)popular proposal", Rotman International Journal of Pension Management, 2(2), 36-40.

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uts:ppaper:2009-3

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