Monetary Policy Transparency:Lessons from Germany and the Eurozone

Iris Biefang-Frisancho and Peter Howells ()

No 410, Working Papers from Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol

Abstract: The conduct of monetary policy emphasises institutional arrangements which make monetary policy decision-making more ‘transparent’. Judged by these institutional features neither the Bundesbank, nor the ECB, score very highly. We test for (i) agents’ average ability to anticipate policy rate changes under the Bundesbank and the ECB and (ii) and agents’ forecasting unanimity of money market rates. Rising forecasting uncertainty may either be due to a lack of ECB transparency or to larger inflation and growth forecasting errors. Our results indicate that inflation forecast spreads widened amongst private agents and that inflation forecasting uncertainty increased the forecasting spread of money market rates

Keywords: transparency; yield curve; forecasting uncertainty; Bundesbank; ECB (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec, nep-fmk, nep-for, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uwe:wpaper:0410

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