Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative

Charles Holt, William Shobe, Dallas Burtraw, Karen Palmer and Jacob Goeree

No 2007-03, Reports from Center for Economic and Policy Studies

Abstract: This report develops recommendations on the most appropriate design for auctions of Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) CO2 allowances. The research was conducted in two phases. Phase 1 included the initial preparation of an annotated bibliography and a round of experiments to investigate the performance of a number of auction types considered to be likely candidates for use in a CO2 allowance auction. The main auction types considered were the sealed-bid, increasing-price sequential (English clock), and decreasing-price sequential (Dutch) auction forms. We also examined whether sealed-bid auctions should use the pay-as-bid (discriminatory) or uniform-price rules. Phase 2 experiments examined auction performance for expanded set of performance measures and in a richer institutional setting. The auction formats were compared with respect to price discovery, that is, ensuring that the price of allowances at auction reflects their market value, and in limiting collusive behavior. We also examined the effect of reserve prices and allowance banking and did more analysis of how the auction combines with secondary (or spot) markets. We looked at the effects of allowing participation in the auction by brokers or other traders not needing allowances for compliance and of combining auctions with “grandfathering†of some allowances for free to generators. In addition, we performed some experiments to look at so-called “hoarding behavior†and the effects of different mechanisms that have been proposed to limit hoarding. In particular, our experiments examined whether holding auctions with participation limited to generators can reduce the effect of hoarding behavior.

Keywords: climate change; allowance; carbon dioxide; co2; RGGI; emission markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 C91 Q4 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 131 pages
Date: 2007-10-15
Note: Research conducted for the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority The additional file is an addendum to the report delivered in April 2008.
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econ.ccps.virginia.edu/RePEc_docs/ceps_docs/rggi_auction_final.pdf (application/pdf)
http://econ.ccps.virginia.edu/RePEc_docs/ceps_docs ... Addendum_April08.pdf (application/pdf)

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