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Social Choice with Analytic Preferences

Michel Le Breton () and John Weymark
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Michel Le Breton: Universite de la Mediterranee

No 23, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: Arrow's axioms for social welfare functions are shown to be inconsistent when the set of alternatives is the nonnegative orthant in a multidimensional Euclidean space and preferences are assumed to be either the set of analytic classical economic preferences or the set of Euclidean spatial preferences. When either of these preference domains is combined with an agenda domain consisting of compact sets with nonempty interiors, strengthened versions of the Arrovian social choice correspondence axioms are shown to be consistent. To help establish the economic possibility theorem, an ordinal version of the Analytic Continuation Principle is developed.

Keywords: Axiomatic social choice; Arrow's theorem; spatial preferences; analytic continuation principle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-06, Revised 2001-03
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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu00-w23R.pdf Revised version, 2001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Social choice with analytic preferences (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Choice with Analytic Preferences (2000) Downloads
Working Paper: Social Choice with Analytic Preferences (1991)
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