The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union

Andrew Hughes Hallett and Diana Weymark ()

No 128, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the EMU. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership are cumulative and can be significant for countries whose structure and/or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.

Keywords: Central bank independence; currency union; EMU; monetary union; preference assymmetries; transmission asymmetries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: The Cost of Heterogeneity in a Monetary Union (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0128

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