Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains

Michel Le Breton () and John Weymark
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Michel Le Breton: GREMAQ and IDEI, Universite de Toulouse 1

No 206, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: This article surveys the literature that investigates the consistency of Arrow's social choice axioms when his unrestricted domain assumptions are replaced by domain conditions that incorporate the restrictions on agendas and preferences encountered in economic environments. Both social welfare functions and social choice correspondences are considered.

Keywords: Social choice; Arrow's Theorem; restricted domains (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-04, Revised 2003-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu02-w06R.pdf Revised version, 2003 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0206

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