Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees

Shigehiro Serizawa and John Weymark

No 216, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between efficiency and distributional goals in exchange economies if the social choice rule is required to be strategy-proof.

Keywords: Social choice; strategy-proofness; exchange economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-06, Revised 2002-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu02-w16R.pdf Revised version, 2002 (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0216

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