EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation

Benjamin Zissimos and Myrna Wooders

No 601, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper argues that, because governments are able to relax tax competition through public good differentiation, traditionally high-tax countries have continued to set taxes at a relatively high rate even as markets have become more integrated. The key assumption is that there is variation in the extent to which firms can use public good provision to reduces costs. We show that, in a setting where tax competition promotes efficiency, governments are able to use this variation to relax the forces of tax competition, which reduces efficiency. In this environment, a `minimum tax' counters the relaxation of tax competition, thereby enhancing efficiency, and `split the difference' tax harmonization also enhances efficiency.

Keywords: Asymmetric equilibrium; core-periphery; tax competition; tax harmonization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H21 H42 H73 R50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu06-w01R.pdf Revised version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentiation (2005) Downloads
Working Paper: Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation (2005) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0601

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-24
Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0601