The GATT and Gradualism

Benjamin Zissimos

No 619, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a `withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.

Keywords: Free trade; gradual trade liberalization; strategic interactions; trade agreement; welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 F02 F13 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu06-w19.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The GATT and gradualism (2007)
Working Paper: The GATT and Gradualism (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0619

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