The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments

Philip Reny (), Eyal Winter () and Myrna Wooders

No 917, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: An outcome of a game is partnered if there are no asymmetric dependencies between any two players. For a cooperative game, a payoff is in the partnered core of the game if it is partnered, feasible and cannot be improved upon by any coalition of players. We show that the relative interior of the core of a game with side payments is contained in the partnered core. For quasi-strictly convex games the partnered core coincides with the relative interior of the core. When there are no more than three partnerships, the sums of the payoffs to partnerships are constant across all core payoffs. When there are no more than three players, the partnered core satisfies additional properties.

Keywords: Partnership; core; cooperative game; convex game; separating collections of sets; minimal partnership; coalition structure games; partitioning games; kernel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu09-w17.pdf First version, 2009 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The partnered core of a game with side payments (2012)
Working Paper: The Partenered Core of a Game With Side Payments (1993)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:0917

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