Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations

Katherine Cuff, Sunghoon Hong (), Jesse Schwartz (), Quan Wen () and John Weymark
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Sunghoon Hong: Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University
Jesse Schwartz: Department of Economics,Kennesaw State University

No 1104, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k � 2. Saks and Yu (Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), 2005, 286-293) have shown that when the number of outcomes is finite and i's valuation type space is convex, nonnegativity of the length of all 2-cycles is sufficient for the nonnegativity of the length of all k-cycles. In this article, it is shown that if each individual's valuation type space is a convex product space and a mild domain regularity condition is satisfied, then (i) the nonnegativity of all 2-cycles implies that all k-cycles have zero length and (ii) all 2-cycles having zero length is necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementability.

Keywords: 2-cycle condition; dominant strategy implementation; mechanism design; revenue equivalence; Rockafellar-Rochet Theorem; Saks-Yu Theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dominant strategy implementation with a convex product space of valuations (2012)
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