Compulsory licensing and patent protection: a North-South perspective

Eric Bond and Kamal Saggi ()

No 16-00011, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: In a stylized model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-holder, we analyze whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's patent protection policy. If South is free to deny patent protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obligated to offer patent protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for patent protection as well as the likelihood of CL.

Keywords: Patented Products; Compulsory Licensing; Imitation; TRIPS; Quality; Welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F2 O3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Chapter: COMPULSORY LICENSING AND PATENT PROTECTION: A NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-16-00006

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