Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions

Paul Edelman (paul.edelman@vanderbilt.edu) and John Weymark
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Paul Edelman: Vanderbilt University

No 18-00003, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers from Vanderbilt University Department of Economics

Abstract: It is shown that any one-person dominant strategy implementable allocation function on a restricted domain of types can be extended to the unrestricted domain in such a way that dominant strategy implementability is preserved when utility is quasilinear. A sufficient condition is identified for which this extension is essentially unique.

Keywords: dominant strategy incentive compatible; implementation theory; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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