World Bank Borrower Relations and Project Supervision

Christopher Kilby

No 32, Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series from Vassar College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper explores the relevance of the principal-agent model for analyzing development projects using data from World Bank-funded projects. After demonstrating that World Bank loan agreements can be viewed as principal-agent contracts, the paper explores the importance of the agency problem in determining project performance. Predictions from an adversarial model contrast with those of a cooperative model. The importance of information in the adversarial model links World Bank supervision to project performance. Data support the relevance of the agency problem and the role of supervision as monitoring. The paper concludes with suggestions for modifying project selection and implementation to reduce agency problems.

Date: 1995-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Canadian Journal of Development Studies, March 2001, 22(1):191-218.

Downloads: (external link)
http://irving.vassar.edu/VCEWP/VCEWP32.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://irving.vassar.edu/VCEWP/VCEWP32.pdf [302 Redirect]--> http://economics.vassar.edu/VCEWP/VCEWP32.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.vassar.edu/economics/VCEWP/VCEWP32.pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: World Bank-borrower relations and project supervision (1994)
Working Paper: World Bank-borrower relations and project supervision (1994)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vas:papers:32

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series from Vassar College Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sean Flynn ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).