Attitudes to Ambiguity in One-Shot Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study

Asen Ivanov (aivanov@vcu.edu)
Additional contact information
Asen Ivanov: Department of Economics, VCU School of Business

No 902, Working Papers from VCU School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about whether subjects are ambiguity-loving, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-averse. The second dimension is about whether subjects are risk-loving, risk-neutral, or risk-averse. The third dimension is about whether subjects are naive or strategic. Our main result is that, in our main treatment, 32/46/22 percent of subjects are classified as ambiguity-loving/ambiguity-neutral/ ambiguity-averse.

Keywords: games; experiments; beliefs; ambiguity; risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 C72 C92 D81 D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:vcu:wpaper:0902

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from VCU School of Business, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oleg Korenok (okorenok@vcu.edu).