Multi-battle contests over complementary battlefields

Daniel Stephenson ()
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Daniel Stephenson: Department of Economics, VCU School of Business

No 2303, Working Papers from VCU School of Business, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies Blotto contests with divisible complementary prizes. Each agent distributes a fixed budget over multiple battlefields. Each battlefield has a single prize which is divided among the competi- tors in proportion to a power function of the corresponding investment levels. Prizes exhibit constant sub-unitary elasticity of substitution. Such contests are shown to have pure strategy Nash equilibria under arbitrarily sensitive battlefield success functions. In contrast, conven- tional Blotto and Tullock contests have no pure strategy Nash equi- libria under sufficiently sensitive battlefield success functions. These results suggest that divisible complementary prizes can help stabilize the distribution of resources in strategic conflicts.

JEL-codes: C62 C70 D74 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2023-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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